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## MONTANA FIRST JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT LEWIS AND CLARK COUNTY

RAISTLEN KATKA,

Plaintiff,

V.

STATE OF MONTANA and MONTANA DEPARTMENT OF CORRECTIONS,

Defendants.

Cause No. BDV-2009-1163

FINDINGS OF FACT, CONCLUSIONS OF LAW, AND ORDER

This matter is before the Court on Plaintiff Raistlen Katka's motion for a preliminary injunction.

## BACKGROUND

This matter was heard over a four-day period from July 20 through 23, 2010. At issue at the July 2010 hearing were Plaintiff's request for a preliminary injunction directing that he be held at the Montana State Hospital pending trial in this matter; that he not be subject to any behavior modification plan (BMP) or restrictive administrative segregation (RAS); and, if he be returned to the Montana State Prison (MSP), that he not be subject to any BMP or RAS.

At the conclusion of the July 23, 2010 hearing, the Court directed that the Plaintiff be housed at the Montana State Hospital, but that he could be removed from the hospital if he engaged in threatening behavior that endangered himself or others. On December 2, 2010, Plaintiff was returned to MSP for assaultive behavior.

Trial in this matter is currently set for February 13, 2012.

On March 31, 2011, the parties filed a stipulation wherein the Plaintiff withdrew his objection to being housed at MSP. He did, however, reserve his right to request additional relief based on the evidence presented at the July 2010 hearing. Since the entry of the stipulation, Plaintiff now requests a preliminary injunction that he not be placed in RAS or that he have a BMP imposed on him pending the trial in February 2013.

Although the parties have stipulated that the Court should rely only on the evidence heard at the July 2010 hearing, the Court, out of necessity to address current issues, must also draw from the affidavits that both sides have submitted since Plaintiff's return to MSP.

The interested reader might well ask why this decision has taken so long? After the July 2010 hearing, the parties and the Court awaited the preparation of the transcript. Then, when Plaintiff was taken back to MSP in December 2010, the matter was scheduled for a show cause hearing in March 2011. After the March hearing was cancelled, the parties submitted additional briefing that was not completed until Plaintiff filed his reply brief in June 2011.

## FINDINGS OF FACT

On September 20, 2007, Plaintiff pled guilty in the Sixteenth Judicial District Court to two counts of felony assault on a peace officer. The plea was entered as a result of an agreement by the Custer County Attorney to dismiss two additional

felony charges, all arising from Plaintiff's assaults against correctional officers at the Pine Hills Youth Correctional Center.

Although he was fifteen years old at the time, Plaintiff, who was represented by counsel, waived his right to a transfer hearing to youth court and agreed to allow the matter to proceed in district court. He was sentenced to the custody of the Montana Department of Corrections (DOC) on concurrent terms of five years on each count, with the condition that he could petition the court to suspend the remainder of his sentence if he successfully completed the boot camp program.

Following his 2007 felony sentencing hearing, Plaintiff was taken to the Missoula Assessment and Sanction Center (MASC) on September 24, 2007 for boot camp screening. MASC is a DOC program within the Missoula County Detention Center and operated under a contract with Missoula County. Offenders are sent to MASC for assessment to determine their needs, risks, and most appropriate placement in the correctional system.

Plaintiff's eligibility for the boot camp was delayed by his inability to maintain clear conduct at MASC. On February 20, 2008, Plaintiff met with the MASC screening committee to discuss his options. He became uncooperative and vulgar; threatened to "bash in" the head of the facility director; threw a chair into a window; and kicked open the door. Plaintiff was restrained by Missoula County detention officers. As a result of the altercation, Plaintiff was removed from MASC and taken to MSP. At the time of his entry into MSP, Plaintiff was 16 years of age.

During his incarceration at MSP, Plaintiff has received approximately 50 infractions for over 35 separate incidents of misconduct, including fights with other inmates, breaking sprinkler heads in his cell, flooding his cell, breaking through fences in the recreational yard, threatening to assault staff, and numerous incidents of

encouraging and participating in gang activity. He was classified to RAS in March 2009, after breaking through two of three fences in the yard of the Close III Housing Unit on the high security side of the prison with two other inmates before they were stopped by correctional officers. Plaintiff remained in RAS until his transfer to the Montana State Hospital in June 2010.

The RAS program requires that an inmate be housed in a solitary cell, locked down 23 hours a day, five days a week, with one hour of solitary recreation in an outdoor facility each of those five days. For the remaining two days a week, the inmate is locked down for 24 hours a day. The RAS program lasts for two years. During the first year, the inmate cannot receive any visitors or phone calls and, if he gets a write-up during this period, the clock starts running again. The inmate must then have another year of clear conduct before being allowed visitors or phone calls. The only program allowed in RAS is solitary cell study, and RAS inmates are not eligible for work assignments, hobby activities, or other programs.

Plaintiff was also approved for placement on a BMP, which is used to control an inmate's violent behavior. BMP imposes a strategy of taking away an inmate's privileges and returning them in intervals when the inmate demonstrates he can conform his conduct to prison policy and be free of dangerous and assaultive behaviors.

Since going to MSP approximately two and one-half years ago, Plaintiff has been cleared for placement on a BMP on three separate occasions. Each clearance is approved upon review by mental health staff and is effective for six months. Mental health professionals are required to assess an inmate to determine whether the dangerous behavior is a direct result of an Axis I serious mental disorder; whether the inmate is knowingly, willingly, and purposely engaging in dangerous behavior;

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whether a higher level of mental health care or observation is indicated; and whether the inmate's mental status is presently deteriorated or deteriorating. All mental health teams members are required to review and approve any request to approve an inmate for BMP clearance. The team members did so in this case. Once an inmate is cleared for BMP, if his behavior warrants, a correctional officer can activate the BMP which results in certain sanctions being placed on the inmate. It would appear to the Court that a BMP can be activated for an inmate with a an Axis I mental illness if the behavior triggering the BMP is not a result of that mental illness.

While cleared for behavior management plans, Plaintiff has been "activated" on a BMP five times during his two and a half years at MSP. An activated BMP consists of three steps:

Step one (48 hours): All items are removed from the inmate's cell. The inmate receives a security mattress, a security blanket, and a safety gown. Meals consist of food loaf delivered on a paper towel. Water supply to the cell is controlled by the unit staff if the inmate's behavior involves flooding.

Step two (24 hours): The inmate receives a pillow and regular state-issue clothing.

Step three (24 hours): The inmate receives regular meals and regular state-issue clothing.

If the inmate complies with each of the three steps of the plan, it is deactivated within four days and all privileges previously available to the inmate are restored. If the inmate engages in additional disruptive conduct, the BMP can be restarted.

The evidence submitted at the hearing (primarily through Defendant's Exhibit E and the testimony of unit manager Chris Conell) shows that Plaintiff was placed on fully activated BMPs on the following dates:

March 5 through 13, 2009, for flooding his cell;

March 19 through 22, 2009, for flooding his cell;

June 7 through 12, 2009, for flooding his cell, being in possession of a weapon, and disobeying a direct order;

June 18 through 24, 2009, for flooding his cell; and

July 20 through 24, 2009, for threatening staff with physical harm and then threatening to break out his cell window.

Thus, over the course of his nearly 30 months at MSP, Plaintiff has been on an active BMP for approximately 25 days, only 4 days of which were in what is known as the "isolation cell" — a cell designed to prevent all means of self-harming or destructive behavior.

In addition to the five full-step BMPs, Plaintiff has twice been placed on what is known as a "Section G" BMP. A Section G BMP may be used when the inmate is engaging in assaultive or dangerous conduct and is not currently cleared for placement on a BMP. Placement on a Section G plan also requires assessment by mental health staff. Consistent with the prison's policy, the Section G plans were in place 24 hours or less on each of the two occasions concerning Plaintiff.

Plaintiff was approved for BMPs in March 2008, September 2008, March 2009, December 2009, and May 2010.

Plaintiff has attempted suicide while in MSP. The first attempt was in March 2009 while he was on a BMP. At that time, Plaintiff bit through a vein in his arm. A similar suicide attempt occurred in June 2009 while Plaintiff was also on a

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BMP. In May 2010, Plaintiff cut an artery and needed to be hospitalized for his recovery. When Plaintiff was returned to the prison from the Deer Lodge hospital, he was put on a Section G BMP.

Plaintiff's last suicide attempt occurred on June 20, 2010. On June 18, 2010, Plaintiff informed a correctional officer that he felt suicidal. Despite his history and his stated suicidality, he was given a razor to shave himself on June 20, 2010. He easily and quickly disassembled the razor and severely cut himself.

At the hearing, the Court heard from a variety of psychologists and psychiatrists. Plaintiff called Dr. Terry Kupers, a psychiatrist from California. Dr. Kupers diagnosed Plaintiff as having two Axis I disorders — major depression and PTSD. According to Dr. Kupers, Plaintiff's mental illness is triggered by the isolation imposed on him in the prison's RAS and BMP programs. While placed in RAS, Plaintiff suffers an increase in despair and an exacerbation of his mental illness.

The Court also heard from Dr. Brenda Roche, a psychologist. Dr. Roche tested Plaintiff on December 2009. She also diagnosed Plaintiff with major depression and PTSD. She further noted that Plaintiff has an antisocial personality disorder. Dr. Roche indicated that the RAS and BMP programs at the prison exacerbate Plaintiff's mental illness.

Dr. Sally Johnson, a well-known psychiatrist specializing in correctional psychiatry, also testified at the hearing. Dr. Johnson diagnosed Plaintiff with a depressive disorder, not otherwise specified. Dr. Johnson felt that Plaintiff's primary diagnosis was antisocial and borderline personality disorder. Dr. Johnson does not believe that PTSD or any other serious mental illness is driving Plaintiff's persistent behavioral problems.

The Court heard from Dr. Virginia Hill from the Montana State Hospital. The Court also received Dr. Hill's affidavit on December 20, 2010, following Plaintiff's discharge from the Montana State Hospital. Dr. Hill does not believe that Plaintiff has a major mental illness. She finds that he does have a depressive disorder, but that mental illness doe not drive his behavior. Dr. Hill testified that Plaintiff's mental condition does not prevent him from being placed on a BMP or RAS.

According to Dr. Hill's December 2010 affidavit, Plaintiff began engaging in antisocial behaviors at the Montana State Hospital in the fall of 2010. (Hill Aff., ¶¶ 10 -12, 14.) Because she was concerned that Montana State Hospital staff would not be able to protect other patients, Dr. Hill requested that Plaintiff be transferred from the hospital to MSP on December 2, 2010. (Id., ¶¶ 17, 18.) Dr. Hill diagnosed Plaintiff as having an antisocial personality disorder (Axis II) and a possible depressive disorder, not otherwise specified. (Id., ¶¶ 22, 25.) According to Dr. Hill, Plaintiff is not seriously mentally ill. (Id., ¶ 23.) Dr. Hill notes that despite everyone's best intentions, Plaintiff may eventually choose to end his life, regardless of the level of care or observation he is on. (Id., ¶ 26.)

Dr. Hill also noted that the Montana State Hospital forensic program treatment team and the MSP mental health treatment team developed a specialized treatment plan to manage Plaintiff's self-destructive behavior in the prison setting. (Hill Aff., Ex. D, see also Mahoney Aff. (Dec. 10, 2010), Ex. 2.) According to Warden Mike Mahoney's affidavit, the treatment plan provided for Plaintiff's discharge from the prison infirmary to the Mental Health Treatment Unit in Close II on December 15, 2010. (Mahoney Aff., ¶ 16.) In that unit, Plaintiff earned his GED.

The Court has also received an affidavit from Warden Mahoney filed on May 20, 2011. (Def.'s Resp. Pl.'s Mot. Ruling Prelim. Inj., Ex. A.) In that

affidavit the Court is informed that in March 2011, Plaintiff was transferred to Housing Unit B (Mental Health Treatment Unit) on the low side of the prison. Plaintiff received a write-up for threatening staff and received a 15-day detention. Following his detention, Plaintiff was returned to the low side of the Mental Health Treatment Unit, where he is continuing his programing. (Mahoney Aff. (May 20, 2011), ¶ 15.)

The Court is presented with clearly differing psychiatric and psychological evidence. Clearly, Plaintiff is a difficult person to manage in an institutional setting. While Plaintiff has done well since his return to MSP in December 2010, that improvement may be, as his attorney suggests, his response to the better treatment and not being placed in the RAS and BMP programs. Further, although his suicidal behavior may be the result of a serious mental illness, it may be a result of his antisocial personality disorder and an attempt to manipulate others. The Court is presented with what appears to be a real danger of suicide on behalf of Plaintiff.

From the foregoing Findings of Fact, the Court enters the following:

## CONCLUSIONS OF LAW

An injunction is an order of the court requiring a party to refrain from a particular act. Section 27-19-101, MCA. A preliminary injunction restrains a party pending trial on the merits and is issued after notice and a hearing. BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 800 (8<sup>th</sup> ed. 1999). The district court is vested with the discretion to determine whether a preliminary injunction should issue and this decision will not be overturned except in instances of manifest abuse. *Sweet Grass Farms, Ltd. v. Bd. of County Comm'rs*, 2000 MT 147, ¶ 20, 300 Mont. 66, 2 P.3d 825; *Porter v. K & S P'ship*, 192 Mont. 175, 181, 627 P.2d 836, 839 (1981).

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The Montana Code provides for the issuance of a preliminary injunction in the following cases:

(1) when it appears that the applicant is entitled to the relief demanded and the relief or any part of the relief consists in restraining the commission or continuance of the act complained of, either for a limited period or perpetually;

(2) when it appears that the commission or continuance of some act during the litigation would produce a great or irreparable injury to the

applicant:

(3) when it appears during the litigation that the adverse party is doing or threatens or is about to do or is procuring or suffering to be done some act in violation of the applicant's rights, respecting the subject of the action, and tending to render the judgment ineffectual;

(4) when it appears that the adverse party, during the pendency of the action, threatens or is about to remove or to dispose of the adverse party's property with intent to defraud the applicant, an injunction order

may be granted to restrain the removal or disposition:

(5) when it appears that the applicant has applied for an order under the provisions of 40-4-121 or an order of protection under Title 40, chapter 15.

Section 27-19-201, MCA.

The Montana Supreme Court determined that the "subsections of this statute are disjunctive, 'meaning that findings that satisfy one subsection are sufficient.' Consequently, only one subsection need be met for an injunction to issue." Sweet Grass Farms, ¶ 27 (citations omitted) (quoting Stark v. Borner, 226 Mont. 356, 359-60, 735 P.2d 314, 317 (1987)). "An applicant for a preliminary injunction must establish a prima facie case or show that it is at least doubtful whether or not he will suffer irreparable injury before his rights can be fully litigated." Id., ¶ 28 (quoting Porter, at 181, 627 P.2d at 839. "In deciding whether an applicant has established a prima facie case, a court should determine whether a sufficient case has been made out to warrant the preservation of the property or rights in status quo until trial, without expressing a final opinion as to such rights." Id. "Status quo' has been defined as /////

'the last actual, peaceable, noncontested condition which preceded the pending controversy.'" *Id.* (quoting *Porter*, at 181, 627 P.2d at 839).

The Court is aware that courts generally afford prison officials wideranging deference to adopt and execute policies to maintain order and discipline in the prison. *Hawkins v. Mont. State Prison*, 2004 MT 289, ¶ 18, 323 Mont. 326, 102 P.3d 2. The Montana Supreme Court has addressed the issue of BMPs in another context. *Walker v. State*, 2003 MT 134, 316 Mont. 103, 68 P.3d 872. This Court recognizes that prison's mental health system has undergone changes since the *Walker* decision. However, *Walker* held that BMPs and other living conditions in the prison could constitute cruel and unusual punishment when it exacerbates an inmate's mental health condition. *Walker*, ¶ 84.

The Court will issue a preliminary injunction prohibiting Plaintiff from being placed in an RAS-type confinement or having a BMP imposed on him until the trial of this matter. The Court does this for a couple of reasons. First, it is clear that Plaintiff is doing well under the current specialized treatment plan mentioned in the latest Mahoney and Hill affidavits. The time between now and the trial is not a particularly long time, and while the Court does not wish to interfere with the prison's legitimate operations, the Court finds that Plaintiff's current treatment plan is working very well and should continue. In this case, Plaintiff has shown that it is at least doubtful whether he will suffer irreparable injury before his rights can be fully litigated. The State is correct that the one psychiatrist who has the most hands-on experience with Plaintiff (Dr. Hill) states that he does not have a major mental illness. However, at this stage of the proceedings, the Court has a very real concern that it is at least doubtful whether the Plaintiff will suffer an irreparable injury (death by suicide) if he is placed in a BMP or RAS program. While Plaintiff may not ultimately prevail

in his case, the Court wants to ensure, to the best of its ability, that Plaintiff be kept as 1 safe as possible in the few short months between the issuance of this Order and the 2 date of the trial. 3 Based on the above Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, the Court 4 enters the following: 5 6 ORDER IT IS HEREBY ORDERED: 7 The Montana Department of Corrections is ENJOINED from 8 1. placing Plaintiff in the restrictive administrative segregation program (RAS) pending 9 further Order of this Court. 10 2. 11 The Montana Department of Corrections is ENJOINED from using solitary confinement and isolation, such as that described in the behavior 12 modification plan policy (BMP) against Plaintiff pending further Order of this Court. 13 3. The Court finds and ORDERS that Plaintiff is appropriately 14 currently housed in the Montana State Prison. 15 4. 16 If, prior to the trial of this matter, Plaintiff presents a management problem that is not able to be addressed by the current specialized treatment plan, the 17 Montana Department of Corrections shall be free to contact this Court for modification 18 of this Order. 19 DATED this \( \sum\_{\text{day}} \) day of August 2011. 20 21 22 JEFFREY M. SHERLOCK 23 District Court/Judge pcs: Andrée M. Larose Jennifer A. Giuttari/Elizabeth L. Griffing 24 Ronald F. Waterman Maxon R. Davis 25 Pamela Snyer-Varnes

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